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Abstract
This paper analyses the dynamic effects of aggregate demand, supply and real oil price shocks on real
output and unemployment. Oil price shocks are included explicitly in the model, to investigate their role
in explaining periods of global recessions. The different structural disturbances are identified by
imposing long-run and short-run restrictions on a vector autoregressive model. The analysis is applied to
Germany, Norway, United Kingdom and United States. For all countries except Norway, an adverse oil
price shock has had a negative effect on output in the short run, and for US, the effect is negative also
in the long run. However, whereas the first oil price shock was the most important factor behind the
severity of the recession in the middle 1970s, adverse demand and supply shocks were more important
than the second oil price shock in explaining the recession in the early 1980s. For Norway, a small oil
exporting country, an adverse oil price shock stimulates the economy, although in the long run, the
effect is most likely zero.
Keywords: Oil price shocks, permanent and trasitory components, structural change, unit root, vector
autoregression.
JEL classification: C22, C32, E32, 057
Akcnowledgement: The author wishes to thank Ragnar Nymoen, Danny Quah, Ådne Cappelen,
Henrik Hansen and participants at seminar meetings at the London School of Economics, University of
Oslo and University of Copenhagen for helpful comments and discussions. Financial support from
Norges Banks fond til økonomisk forskning, Den norske Banks fond and the Research Council of
Norway is acknowledged.
Address: Hilde Christiane Bjørnland, Statistics Norway, Research Department,
P.O.Box 8131 Dep., N-0033 Oslo, Norway. E-mail: hbj@ssb.no
1. Introduction
Several economists have argued that the two successive adverse oil price shocks in 1973/1974 and
1979/1980, could be blamed for the severe periods of inflation and recessions facing the world economy
in the middle 1970s and the early 1980s, (see e.g. Hamilton 1983, Burbidge and Harrison 1984, Gisser
and Goodwin 1986, and Ferderer 1996). However, in the aftermath of the second oil price shock, tight
macroeconomic policies were also implemented in many industrial countries, to combat the high
inflation rates experienced. These disinflationary policies may have worsened the recession that was
already associated with the energy price increases, (see e.g. Rasche and Tatom 1981, Darby 1982 and
Ahmed et al. 1988). Some countries like the United Kingdom, also adopted tight fiscal policies from the
early 1980s, which may have reduced output growth and increased unemployment in the following
years. Did the oil price shocks trigger off the international recessions in the middle 1970s and early
1980s, or were there other factors like the contractionary macroeconomic policies implemented in each
country after the energy price shocks, that should be blamed for the poor economic performance?
This paper uses a structural vector autoregression (VAR) model to analyse the dynamic effects of real
oil price shocks on output and unemployment. The complexity of ways that energy shocks can
influence the economy, typically motivates the use of a VAR model, instead of a fully specified large
scale model, (that is specified through a whole set of relations restrictions). In addition to oil price
shocks, I assume there may be aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks that also hit the
economy. Demand and supply disturbances are defmed and distinguished from each other by
imposing long-run restrictions on a VAR model. Especially, I interpret shocks that have permanent
effects on output as aggregate supply shocks (e.g. technology changes), and shocks that have only
temporary effects on output as aggregate demand shocks (e.g. monetary changes). However, in the
short and medium term, both shocks are free to influence output. The long run restriction used to
identify supply and demand shocks, is similar to that employed by Blanchard and Quah (1989). I
impose no restrictions on the response of output to oil price shocks.
Once identified, the VAR model also provides a method for how to decompose a nonstationary
variable like output into a trend and a cyclical component. Especially, the VAR model implies that
output movements will be due to three different disturbances; demand, supply and oil price shocks.
As supply and oil price shocks are allowed to have permanent effects on output, these two
components will be nonstationary, contributing toward the long run movements (the trend) in the
output series. The demand component will be stationary, making up the short run movements (the
business cycles) in output. However, as both the supply and oil price component can also affect
output in the short term, essentially all three components contribute towards the business cycles.
The analysis is applied to Germany, Norway, United Kingdom and United States. Of these countries,
Norway and UK have been self sufficient with oil resources during most of the period examined,
whereas the remaining countries are net oil importers. For all countries except Norway, an adverse oil
price shock has had a negative effect on output in the short run, and for the US, the effect is negative
also in the long run (ten years). For Germany, UK and US, the oil price shock in 1973/1974 played an
important role in explaining the recession in the middle 1970s, whereas the recession experienced in
the early 1980s, was largely caused by other demand and supply disturbances. For Norway, (whose
oil producing sector plays a large role in the economy), the effect of oil price shocks on output is
positive at all horizons, although in the long run the effect is not necessarily significant.
This paper is organised as follows. In section two I present some indicators that describe the
macroeconomic performance of Germany, Norway, UK and US over the whole period examined.
Section three describes a model of economic fluctuations, where energy price shocks are among the
disturbances hitting the economy. In section four, I present the structural VAR model. Section five
reviews the effect of the different shocks on average for output and unemployment, and the relative
importance of the different shocks in accounting for the forecast errors in the variables is assessed. In
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section six, the impacts of the different shocks on output are analysed in different historical periods.
Here, I specifically focus on the effects of the energy price increases in 1973/1974 and 1979/1980 on
the level of output. Section seven concludes. All calculations are performed using GAUSS and
RATS, unless otherwise stated.
2. Macroeconomic performance
A comparison of some OECD countries, shows that real GDP grew at a much faster rate in Norway
than in the other OECD countries in the aftermath of the oil price shock in 1973/1974 and 1979/1980.
While Germany, United Kingdom and United States saw their prosperous growth rates from the
1960s fall back during the international recession in the 1970s and early 1980s, Norway managed to
maintain growth rates at the 1960s OECD levels (cf. table 1).
The favourable economic performance in Norway until the late 1980s, has been attributed to the
discovery and use of oil resources in Norway from 1970 onwards, which stimulated the economy so it
grew at a higher rate than otherwise would have been possible. Especially, the government followed a
highly expansionary fiscal policy in the 1970s. Despite the fact that the United Kingdom was self
sufficient of oil resources by the time the second oil price shock occurred in 1979, UK has experienced a
much deeper and longer recession than most other oil importing countries from the middle 1970s.
Table 1. Macroeconomic indicators.
Pct. change from previous year (average), unless otherwise stated 
United States	 Germany'	 United Kingdom	 Norway
Real GDP
	1968-1973	 3.2	 4.9	 3.4	 4.1
	
1974-1979
	 2.6	 2.4	 1.5	 4.9
	
1980-1985
	 2.1	 1.1	 1.3	 3.5
	
1986-1991	 2.2	 3.6	 2.5	 1.6
	
1992-1994	 3.2	 1.3	 1.8	 3.6
CPI
	1968-1973	 5.0	 4.6	 7.5	 6.9
	
1974-1979
	 8.6	 4.7	 15.7	 8.7
	
1980-1985
	 6.8	 4.2	 9.0	 9.4
	
1986-1991
	 4.0	 1.7	 5.9	 5.8
	
1992-1994	 2.9	 3.7	 2.6	 2.0
Unemployment, levelb
	1968-1973
	 4.6	 1.0	 3.3	 1.7
	
1974-1979
	 6.7	 3.2	 5.0	 1.8
	
1980-1985
	 8.0	 5.8	 10.5	 2.6
	
1986-1991
	 5.9	 5.6	 8.8	 3.8
	1992-1994	 6.7	 5.9	 10.1	 5.8 
Sources: OECD Historical statistics 1960-1989, OECD Economic Outlook, various issues.
a) Data for CPI and Unemployment refer to Western Germany
b) Standardised unemployment rates, (average)
With low growth rates in most industrial countries, unemployment rates started to increase in the
1970s. Especially, unemployment rates rose drastically from the middle of the 1970s in US and
Germany and from the early 1980s in UK. In Norway on the other hand, unemployment rates have
remained low until the late 1980s (cf. table 1). For all countries except Germany, the high oil prices
in the 1970s were also followed by increasing inflation rates. During this period, several countries
also adopted tight monetary policy and in some cases tight fiscal policy (e.g. in UK from the early
1980s), to combat the high inflation rates experienced.
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Based on the information in table 1, one can argue that both the first and the second energy price
shocks preceded periods of low growth rates and increasing unemployment rates in all countries but
Norway, and high inflation rates in all countries except Germany. However, whether the oil price
shocks actually caused the recessions experienced in these countries, or whether for instance the
macroeconomic policies implemented in each country after each energy price shock are to be blamed
for the poor economic performances, can not be answered by examining table 1. The remaining of
this paper sets out to analyse the effects of real oil price shocks on output and unemployment in each
country using instead a structural VAR model. The interpretation of the structural shocks in the VAR
model will be motivated by a simple economic model of output fluctuations as described below.
3. Oil price shocks and economic fluctuations
Analysis of the linkages between energy and the aggregate economy is complicated, as it is difficult
to capture all the channels of influence without a fully specified model. Energy shocks may typically
have both demand and supply effects on the real activity. The supply effect of a higher real energy
price, may affect output via the aggregate production function by reducing the net amount of energy
used in the production. The effects on the other resources used in the production will depend on
whether we substitute more or less of the other resources. The employed resources may further be
indirectly affected, if wage rigidities prevent markets from clearing.
In addition, aggregate demand may also change in response to energy price changes. An oil price
increase will typically lead to a transfer of income from the oil importing countries to the oil
exporting countries. This reduction in income will induce the rational consumers in oil importing
countries to hold back on their consumption spending, which will reduce aggregate demand and
output. However, to the extent that the increase in income in the oil exporting countries will increase
demand from the oil importing countries, this effect will be minimised. Finally, the level of demand
may also change due to actions taken by the government in response to changes in oil prices. For
instance, several countries pursued countercyclically monetary policy following the second oil price
shock to offset the increase in the general price level, which lowered real activity'.
Below I propose a simple economic model where energy price shocks may affect the economy
through several channels. In addition to energy price shocks, I assume that there are other demand
and supply shocks that also hit the economy. The model is a variant of a simple (Keynesian) model of
output fluctuations like Fischer (1977), adopted from Blanchard and Quah (1989) (BQ hereafter), and
consists of an aggregate demand function, a production function, a price setting behaviour and a wage
setting behaviour. The model is modified by including real oil prices into the system:
(1) yt = m t — pt + a8 + bot
(2) yt = n t
 + + cot
(3) p t =w e t + dot
(4) w t = w EEt-int =
y is the log of real output, o is the log of real oil prices, n is the log of employment, 9 is the log of
productivity, p is the log of the nominal price level, w is the log of the nominal wage, and m is the log
I See e.g. Bohi (1989) and Mork (1994) for a further theoretical discussion.
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of nominal money supply. Ft implies the log of full employment. The unemployment rate is defined
as u = flT —
 n.
Equation (1) states that aggregate demand is a function of real balances, productivity and real oil
prices. Real oil prices are introduced into the aggregate demand function as the level of aggregate
demand may change with higher oil prices. Both productivity an d real oil prices are allowed to affect
aggregate demand directly. If a>0, a higher level of productivity may imply higher investment
demand (cf. Blanchard and Quah, 1989 p. 333), whereas if b<0, higher real oil prices may imply a
lower level of demand by e.g. the rational consumers2 .
The production function (2) relates output to employment, technology and real energy prices, through
an increasing return Cobb-Douglas production function (cal4). Real oil prices are explicitly included
as a third factor of production. As will be seen below, it is through this mechanism that oil prices will
affect output in the long run. The production function is a variant of Rasche and Tatom (1981), which
relates output to labour input, capital input, the real price of oil and a time trend through a constant
return to scale technology. The real price of oil is used in the production function instead of an
energy quantity, as competitive producers treat the real price of oil as parametric, see e.g. Rasche and
Tatom (1981, pp. 22-24) and Darby (1982, p. 739).
The price setting behaviour (3) gives nominal prices as a mark up on real oil prices and wages
adjusted for productivity. Real oil prices are introduced into the price setting equation, to allow prices
to be a mark up on oil prices, so that oil prices can also affect the level of aggregate demand through
the price effect in (3). Wages are chosen one period in advance to achieve full employment (4). The
model is closed by assuming m, O and o evolve according to:
(5) mt =m_1 + E tAD
(6) 0 , =et_i +stAs
(7) °t =	 + E
where, EAD EAS and em e serially uncorrelated, orthogonal demand, supply and real oil price_
shocks. Solving for Ay and u yield:
(8) Ay, = Aettl) aA E ;IS + (b — d)A E t°P + s tAS cs OP,
(9) 	ut = _s;4D a6 AS
Solving for the level of output, yt, one can see that only supply and oil price shocks will affect the
level of output in the long run (through the production function), as y t will be given as accumulations
of these two shocks. The size of c will determine the magnitude of the long run effect of the oil price
shock on output. However, in the short run, due to nominal and real rigidities, all three disturbances
can influence output. From (9) one can see that neither of the shocks will have long run effects on
unemployment. In BQ, only aggregate supply shocks were found to have long run effects on output.
By including oil prices into the system, I have disentangled the effects of oil price shocks from
productivity (aggregate supply) shocks, and shown that they can have different (short and) long run
effects on output.
2 b>0 is plausible for Norway, where the oil producing sector is large compared to the rest of the economy. Higher oil prices
will typically increase the level of demand from energy producers (like the government).
+ (c + d — b)e t°P
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The finding that aggregate demand shocks have only short term effects on output, is also consistent
with the interpretation of an upward sloping short run supply schedule, but a vertical long run supply
schedule. A positive demand shock (e.g. a monetary expansion) will typically increase output (and
prices) along the short run supply schedule, inducing a temporary fall in unemployment. In the long
run, the economy adjusts to higher prices, and the short run supply schedule shifts backwards to its long
run equilibrium output level, consistent with a natural rate of unemployment. However, the speed of
adjustment to a demand shock is unrestricted and may be instantaneous (as in the New Classical School)
or slow (as in the Keynesian models with a relatively flat short run supply schedule)3 .
4. Structural VARS and integrated data
Sims (1980) first proposed to use VARs as an alternative to the traditional structural models. Sims'
main dissatisfaction with large scale econometric models was that too many parameters were
identified in these models by excluding variables, most often lagged endogenous variables, without
proper theoretical justifications. The results from simulations on a fully specified large scale model,
would typically be a product of the structure of the model. In Sims' original work, the system was
identified recursively. Empirical studies analysing the effects of oil price shocks like Burbidge and
Harrison (1984) and Ahmed et al. (1988), typically adopted this identification structure. This implies
a causal ordering on how the system works. Subsequently, Sims (1986), Bernanke (1986), Blanchard
and Watson (1986) and Blanchard (1989) have suggested that one might choose a more 'structural'
system of the VAR, by choosing restrictions (typically short run restrictions), which are based on
economic or statistical reasoning. Other researchers have exploited other type of restrictions, and
Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Shapiro and Watson (1988) used long run restrictions to identify the
system. Especially, BQ imposed long run restrictions on a bivariate VAR model of the first
differences of output and the.(detrended) unemployment rate, to distinguish between disturbances
that have only transitory effects on the level of output (e.g. aggregate demand shocks), and
disturbances that have permanent effects on the level of output (e.g. aggregate supply shocks).
Here I will show how I instead can use a combination of short run and long run restrictions on a VAR
model, to identify different types of structural shocks. The VAR model specified here, focuses on
three variables; Real output, real oil prices and unemployment. As suggested by equations (7)-(9),
these variables are a minimum of variables that are necessary to identify three structural disturbances;
aggregate demand, supply and oil price shocks. The long run restriction applied here is motivated by
the findings in (8), namely that aggregate demand shocks have no long mn effects on output. This
restriction is similar to that applied in BQ, although there the economy is subject to only one type of
shock with long run effect, namely aggregate supply shock. If for instance there are many supply
disturbances that each affects the dynamic interaction between output and unemployment differently,
their interpretations may be meaningless (Blanchard and Quah 1989, p. 659). As demonstrated in (8),
both productivity shocks and real oil price shocks may have long run effects on output, and should
therefore be examined separately. Finally, real oil price shocks will be identified by imposing
contemporaneous restrictions on the equation for oil prices.
In this analysis, both GDP and real oil prices will be taken to be nonstationary integrated, I(1),
variables, where stationarity is obtained by taking first differences 4. Unemployment is assumed to be
a stationary, 1(0), variable. First, I define z as a vector of stationary macroeconomic variables
z,. (Ay t, Aot, u,)', where Ay, is the first differences of the log of real GDP, Ao, is the first difference
of the log of real oil prices and u, is the unemployment rate 5 .
3
 For a textbook discussion, see e.g. Dornbusch and Fischer (1994).
4 The whole exercise would be meaningless if real GDP did not contain a unit root, as one of the aims of this analysis is to
calculate permanent and transitory components in GDP. If GDP instead had been (trend)-stationary, no shocks like e.g.
technology changes would have long run impacts on GDP.
5 The assumptions of stationarity are discussed and verified empirically below in section five.
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A reduced form of ; can be modelled as:




p tp 	 t
A(L)z t =a +e t
where A(L) is the matrix lag operator, Ao = I and e, is a vector of reduced form residuals with
covariance matrix O. To go from the reduced form to the structural model, a set of identifying
restrictions must be imposed. As all the variables defined in zt are stationary, z t is a covariance
stationary vector process. The Wold Representation Theorem implies that under weak regularity
conditions, a stationary process can be represented as an invertible distributed lag of serially
uncorrelated disturbances. The implied moving average representation from (10) can be found and
written as (ignoring the constant term for now):
z t =Co e t +Ci e t_ i + C2 e_2 -F.(11)
zt = C(L)e t
where C(L)=A(L) -1 and Co is the identity matrix. The Ci
 matrix refers to the moving average
coefficient at lag j. As the elements in e, are contemporaneously correlated, they can not be
interpreted as structural shocks. The elements in et are orthogonalized by imposing restrictions. A
(restricted) form of the moving average containing the vector of original disturbances as linear
combinations of the Wold innovations can be found as:
(12) z t =Doe +
z t =D(L)e t
where E, are orthogonal structural disturbances which for convenience I normalise so they all have
unit variance, e.g. cov(E,)=I. The assumption that the underlying structural disturbances are linear
combinations of the Wold innovations (e,) is essential, as without it the economic interpretations of
certain VAR models may change, see e.g. Lippo and Reichlin (1993) and Blanchard and Quah (1993)
for a discussion of the problem of nonfundamentalness. With Co as the identity matrix, (11) and (12)
imply that e,=D0E, , and C)30=Dj so:
(13) C(L)Do = D(L)
If Do is identified, I can derive the MA representation in (12) since C(L) is identifiable through
inversions of a finite order A(L) polynomial. Consistent estimates of A(L) can be found by applying
OLS to (10). However, the Do matrix contains nine elements, and to orthogonalise the different
innovations we need nine restrictions. First, from the normalisation of
 var(c) it follows that:
(14) S/ = /30 /30 '
There are n(n+1)/2 distinct covariances (due to symmetry) in O. With a three variable system, this
imposes six restrictions on the elements in Do. Three more restrictions are then needed to identify Do.
One will come from a restriction on the long run multipliers of the D(L) matrix, whereas the other
two will come from restrictions on the contemporaneous matrix D o directly. I first order the three
AD
	
1AS. 	 ADserially uncoffelated orthogonal structural shocks as: E, = (E, , OP , E, ) , where Et 	s an
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aggregate demand shock, E, °P is a real oil price shock and E,As is an aggregate supply (or
productivity) shock.
As zt is defined as a vector of stationary variables, none of the three structural shocks will have long
run effects on the rate of change in output,Ayt, the rate of change in real oil prices, Aot, or
unemployment, ut. However, both output and real oil prices are integrated variables, so all shocks can
have long run effects on the level of these variables. From (12) the effect of a demand shock on the
rate of change in output, ilyt, after j periods is given as D 11 , j, whereas the effect of a demand shock on
the level of output, yt, after k periods is	 k D 1 . . The restriction that aggregate demand shocksh.„,, i=0 	 14
have no long run effects upon the level of ye is then simply found by setting the infinite number of
lag coefficients, 'S" cle 0 D 1IJ , equal to zero. From (13), the long run expression,
fco
 C .D = - D can be written out in its full matrix format as:J.0 ./ 0 	'
c 11 (1)C12 (1)C 13 (1) 1 D11,01312,0D13,0	 D li (1)D12 (1)D 13 (1)
C21 (1)C22 (1)C23 (1) D21,01)22,0D23,0 = D21 (1)D22 (1)D23 (1)
C31 (1)C32 (1)C33 (1) Dq i nar) Aar; A	
• 
D31 (1)D32 (1)D33 (1)
	_ 	 •
where C(1) ri o
 Ci and 0(1) =	 o Di indicate the long run matrixes of C(L) and D(L)
respectively. C(1) is observable, found by inversion of A(1). The long run identification then implies
that D 11(1). O. Hence:
(15) C 11 (1)D 11 , 0
 + C12 (1)D21,0 + C13 (1 )1)31,0 = O
In our trivariate system, two further restrictions are required to identify the system. These are found
by assuming two short-mn restrictions on oil prices. In (7), oil prices were assumed to be exogenous,
with changes in oil prices driven by exogenous oil price shocks. In a more complex model, demand
and supply shocks may also affect oil prices, at least from large economies as the US. However, oil
prices have been dominated by a few large exogenous developments, (e.g. the OPEC embargo in
1973, the Iranian revolution in 1978/1979, the Iran-Iraq War in 1980/1981, the change in OPEC
behaviour in 1986, and most recently, the Persian Gulf War in 1990/1991). The oil price is a fmancial
spot price that reacts quickly to news. I therefore assume that if demand and supply shocks influence
oil prices, they do so with a lag. Hence the contemporaneous effects of demand and supply shocks in
each country on real oil prices are zero, and only exogenous oil price shocks will contemporaneously
affect oil prices. However, after a period (one quarter), both demand and supply shocks are free to
influence oil prices. The two short term restrictions on real oil prices then imply that:
(16) D21021,0 :7- D23,0 17:
The system is now just identifiable. By using a minimum of restrictions I have been able to
disentangle movements in three endogenous variables (real output, real oil prices and unemployment)
into parts that are due to three structural shocks (aggregate demand, supply and oil price shocks). It
turns out that the system is linear in its equations, and can be solved numerically6 .
6 Note that no restrictions are imposed on the long run effects of demand shocks on real oil prices. However, one would
expect demand shocks to have zero influence on the real oil price in the long term, as the domestic price level will adjust to
the new situation. By examination, I find the effects of demand shocks on oil prices to be negligible in the long run.
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Despite the many advantages of using a simple structural VARs, it is also subject to some limitations.
Especially, a small VAR should be viewed as an approximation to a larger structural system, since
the limited number of variables and the aggregate nature of the shocks, implies that we will for
instance not be able to distinguish between different aggregate demand shocks (like e.g. increases in
money supply or fiscal policy)7 . One way to assess whether the identification structure applied here is
meaningful, is to empirically examine whether the different shocks have had the effects as expected
in the different periods examined. This will be discussed in the sections that follows.
5. Empirical results
In the VAR model specified above, the variables were assumed to be stationary and the level of the
variables were not cointegrating. Below I perform some preliminary  data analyses, to verify whether I
have specified the variables according to their time series properties. The dynamic effects of the
different shocks on the variables are thereafter estimated.
5.1. Data analysis and model specifications
The data used for each country is the log of real GDP, the log of real oil prices converted to each
country's national currency and the total unemployment rate (see appendix A for data descriptions and
sources)8 . The lag order of the VAR-models are determined using the Schwarz (SC) and Hannan-Quinn
(HQ) information criteria and the F-forms of likelihood ratio tests for model reductions as suggested by
Doomik and Hendry (1994). Lag lengths between one and eight orders are considered. I report two
different types of F-tests, one where I reduce the order of the VAR model sequentially and one where the
order of the VAR is reduced directly. The test statistics are given in table B.1-B .4 in appendix B for US,
Germany, UK and Norway respectively. Both the SC and HQ information criteria are minimised using
two lags in US, two (SC) or three (HQ) lags in Germany, and one lag in both UK and Norway. However,
based on the 5 pct. critical levels, the F-tests suggest that we keep three lags in US, five lags in Germany,
four lags in UK, and two lags in Norway.
If the models selected are correctly specified, then the residual autocorrelations will be uncorrelated. To
test for serial correlation in the residuals, I use the Ljung-Box Q-statistic. Using the VAR model with
three lags in US and five lags in Germany, the Ljung-Box Q-statistic showed no evidence of serial
correlations in the residuals. However, using two lags for Norway, I could not accept the hypothesis that
the residuals were white noise. By increasing the lag length, the white noise properties improve
significantly, and at six lags I do not have to accept the hypothesis that the residuals are non-white. For
UK, the white noise properties also improve considerably increasing the lags in the VAR model from
four to six lags. Eventually I then estimate VAR models with three lags in US, five lags in Germany, and
six lags in Norway and UK9 . These results are reported in table B.5 in appendix B.
GDP and oil prices are taken to be I(1) in the analysis. To test whether the underlying process of GDP
and oil prices contain a unit root, I use the augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) regression. The test results
and details on the estimation procedure are seen in appendix C. In none of the countries can I reject the
hypothesis that GDP and oil prices are I(1) in favour of the trend stationary alternative. Further, in all
countries, I can reject the hypothesis that oil prices and GDP are integrated of second order 1(2).
7 Blanchard and Quah (1989) discuss whether it is plausible to assume only one source of aggregate demand disturbance.
However, they show that in the situation where the economy is subject to many demand disturbances that each have different
dynamic effects on output but leave the relation between output and unemployment unaffected, their aggregation proposition
is still valid (Blanchard and Quah 1989, p. 669-672). Gali (1992), uses the same identification structure as in BQ, but
distinguishes between transitory IS (fiscal policy) and money supply shocks. Essentially he finds output to respond very
similar to these two temporary shocks, although IS shocks dies out more quickly than money supply shocks.
8 Note that for Norway, mainland GDP is used instead of total GDP, as 15-20 pct. of total GDP is generated in the oil sector.
9 To investigate whether the results are very sensitive to the truncation of lags, I also estimated VAR models using eight lags
for all countries. However, the results using eight lags did not differ much from the results presented below, and can be
obtained from the author on request.
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Unemployment is taken to be 1(0) in the analysis m. Based on data available on unemployment for most
of this century, there is little to suggest that there has been a time trend in the development of the
unemployment rate in most countries. However, when investigated from the 1960s and onwards,
unemployment seems to behave in a nonstationary way in many countries. Especially, unemployment
seems to have increased drastically from the middle 1970s in US and Germany, from the early 1980s in
UK and from the late 1980s in Norway (cf. table 1).
Based on the ADF tests, in none of the countries could I reject the hypothesis that unemployment is
I(1). However, the ADF tests may fail to reject the unit-root hypothesis if the true data generating
process is a stationary process around a trend with one structural break. This structural change may
be due to an episode like the global oil price shock in 1973 that had an adverse permanent effect on
many economic series (see e.g. Perron 1989). Below I follow Zivot and Andrews (1992), and test the
null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative hypothesis that unemployment is stationary
around a deterministic time trend with a one time break that is unknown prior to testing. The break in
the trend is either modelled as a single change in the level of the trend, as a single change in the
growth rate of the trend, or as both a change in the level and the growth rate of the trend at the same
time. A description of the tests and the estimation results are presented in appendix C.
Based on Zivot and Andrews'(1992) critical values, I can reject the hypothesis that unemployment is
I(1) in Norway at the 5 pct. level, in favour of a change in the level of the trend when the break point
was estimated to 1988Q2. For UK, I can reject the hypothesis that unemployment is I(1) at the 10 pct.
level, in favour of a change in both the level and the growth rate in the trend in 1980Q2. For
Germany, the hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 10 pct. level in favour of a change in the
growth rate in the trend in 1985Q3. For US, I can reject the hypothesis of a unit root in favour of the
deterministic trend with a break in 1974Q3, but only at the 20 pct. level. Although a deterministic
trend is included in the estimation procedure, for Norway, UK and US, the trend in unemployment is
virtually flat before and after the break and may not even be significant.
Can one conclude anything based on the timing of these break dates? For US, the break occurred at the
time of the first oil price shock (1974), whereas in UK, the break in the trend in =employment occurred at
the time of the second oil price shock (1980). However, the time of the break in UK also corresponds to a
period of tight monetary and fiscal policy during the first years of the Thatcher government. Especially, the
adoption of targets for the public sector borrowing requirements (see e.g. Buiter and Miller 1983), may
have had long lasting negative effects on the economy. For Germany, the break point came in 1985.
Unemployment had increased steadily from 1973, but after 1985, unemployment has remained relatively
stable. This (favourable) change in unemployment in 1985, corresponds approximately to the start of the oil
price collapse in the middle 1980s. The break point for unemployment in Norway coincides with what was
found in Bjornland (1995), in which the timing of the break occurred in a period of fmancial crisis and
recession in the late 1980s. The preceding years had been characterised by a huge consumption and
investment boom, that was primarily set off by the financial deregulation in the middle 1980s.
Further, in the VAR model specified above, there are no cointegration relations. Rewriting ze as a
cointegrated formula, we = (ye, oe, th)' , where ut is the unemployment rate adjusted for the structural
break, and using the maximum likelihood estimation procedure advocated by Johansen (1988, 1991),
I can confirm that none of the variables in the VAR models are cointegrated (again, see appendix C
for a description of the estimation procedure and the results). Hence, the variables are appropriately
modelled as described by the VAR model above.
10 Models that find unemployment to be stationary, argue that there is a 'natural' level of unemployment, determined by
social institutions like e.g. union bargain power. Supply and demand shocks have only temporary effects on unemployment,
and in the long run, wages and prices will adjust so unemployment returns to its natural level, see e.g. Layard, Nickell and
Jackman (1991). In models that find unemployment to be nonstationary, technology changes may have long run impact on
unemployment, see e.g. Blanchard and Summers (1986) model of 'hysteresis'.
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5.2. Dynamic responses to aggregate demand, aggregate supply and oil price shocks
The cumulative dynamic effects (calculated from equation 12) of demand, supply and oil price
shocks on GDP are reported in figures 1A-D, whereas the dynamic effects of the same three
disturbances on unemployment are seen in figures 2A-D. In figures D.1-D.3 in appendix D, the
dynamic effects of demand, supply and oil price shocks on GDP and unemployment in US are agai▪ n
reported, but now with one standard deviation band around the point estimates. Figures D.4-D.6 also
report the effects of oil price shocks on GDP and unemployment with one standard deviation bands
for Germany, UK and Norway respectively" 12 .
Figure 1. GDP responses'
A) US;	 B) Germany;
1) AD = Aggregate Demand shock, OP = Oil Price shock, AS = Aggregate Supply shock.
In all countries except Norway, an (one standard error) adverse oil price shock lowers real GDP the
first two to three years. The effect is largest after six quarters, where a one unit (adverse) oil price
shock lowers GDP by 0.3-0.5 pct. in Germany, UK and US. The effect thereafter nearly dies out in
11 The standard errors reported in appendix D are calculated using Monte Carlo simulation based on normal random
drawings from the distribution of the reduced form VAR. The draws are made directly from the posterior distribution of the
VAR coefficients, as suggested in the RATS manual. The standard errors that correspond to the distributions in the D(L)
matrix are then calculated using the estimate of Do.
12 The one standard deviation bands of the effects of demand and supply disturbances for Germany, UK and Norway, can be
obtained from the author on request.
12
Germany and UK, whereas for US, real GDP is reduced with a total of 0.4 pct. after ten years.
Appendix D confirms that in the long run (ten years), only US shows a significant negative effect of
oil price shocks on GDP, whereas in UK and Germany, the effects of oil price shocks on GDP are not
significantly different from zero after two years, as the one standard deviation bands around the point
estimate include zero. In Norway, the adverse oil price shock has an initial (negligible) negative
effect on GDP, but the effect thereafter becomes positive, until GDP has increased by about 0.2-0.3
pct. after ten years. Based on figure D.6A in appendix D, I can nevertheless not conclude that the
effect of oil price shocks on GDP is significantly positive in the long mn, as the one standard error
band includes zero and becomes wider as the horizon increases.
A demand shock has a positive impact effect on the level of GDP in all countries. The response is
highest in the smallest country, Norway (cf. figure 1D), where a unit shock has about 1.5 pct. effect
on GDP. The response of GDP in all countries thereafter declines gradually as the long run restriction
bites. The standard error bands also confirm that demand shocks die out over time, and for e.g. US,
the effect of a demand shock on GDP is not significantly different from zero after four years (cf.
figure D.2A).
Supply disturbances have a permanent effect on the level of GDP in all countries. The impact effect
of a one unit supply shock is positive, varying from 0.2 to 1.1 pct., with again the highest response in
the smallest country, Norway. After ten years, the effect of a unit shock has stabilised, increasing
GDP with 0.4-0.6 pct. in Germany and US, and with 0.8-1.0 pct. in UK and Norway. However, the
point estimate is not precisely estimated, and for e.g. US, the one standard deviation band includes
values between 0.4 and 0.8 after ten years, (cf. figure D.3A) 13 .
It is interesting to compare the results for US, with the findings in Blanchard and Quah (1989).
Whereas BQ found the initial output response in US after a supply shocks to be small and
approaching zero the first two quarters, I find the output response in US to be much higher initially.
On the other hand, I find real oil price shocks to have negative effects on output at all horizons.
Hence, the initial negative response in output to supply shocks reported in BQ, may therefore be due
to the fact that they have not separated the effects of oil price shocks from the other supply
(productivity) shocks.
Real oil price shocks have little effect on unemployment rates in all countries. In US, UK and
Germany, an oil price disturbance has increased the unemployment rate by less than 0.1 pct. points
after two years, but thereafter the effect dies out. In Norway, the effect is negligible, increasing
unemployment rates initially with less than 0.05 pct. points. The standard deviation bands reported in
appendix D, also indicate that the effects of oil price shocks on unemployment are not really
significantly different from zero for more than a few quarters.
Note that although the oil price shocks have larger effects on output in US than in Germany, the
adverse effects on unemployment from oil price shocks are larger in Germany than in US. However,
for US I have allowed for an increase in the unemployment rate by shifting the trend upwards in 1974
(cf. section 5.1), which corresponds to the timing of the first oil price shock. This implies that the oil
price shock in 1973/1974 may have had a permanent adverse effect on unemployment in US, in
addition to the effects I have reported above.
The response of unemployment to aggregate demand shocks mirrors the response of output to the
same disturbances. The effect of a positive demand shock reduces the unemployment rate
immediately in all countries. The effect is largest after about a year. The effect is smallest in Norway,
where unemployment is reduced with less than 0.2 pct. point, and largest in UK and US, where
13 Standard deviation bands around the impulse responses functions using standard VARs will typically be wide, see e.g.
Runkle (1987) and the comments in the same journal.
13
unemployment is reduced with approximately 0.3-0.4 pct. points. The effect thereafter declines, until
after three to four years, the effect on unemployment is not significantly different from zero.
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1) AD = Aggregate Demand shock, OP = Oil Price shock, AS = Aggregate Supply shock.
A positive supply disturbance on the other hand, work to increase the unemployment rate in all
countries initially, (although the effect is negligible in Germany). The effect is largest in UK, where
unemployment increases with about 0.4 pct. points initially. After two quarters, the unemployment
rate decreases and becomes negative in US and Germany, whereas in UK and Norway, the effect
remains positive for about three years, until it eventually dies out.
Finally, note that whereas both demand and supply shocks have hit real output much harder in
Norway than in the other three countries, the effects on unemployment from the same shocks are
much smaller in Norway than in the other countries. As Norway is a small open economy, one would
typically expect there to be large effects from the different shocks on the real economy. The fact that
unemployment seems to be less affected than GDP in Norway than in the other countries, implies that
the labour market may have been sheltered from these shocks, (by e.g. accommodating policies
implemented by the government).
Next, I set out to calculate the relative contribution of the different shocks to output and
unemployment variations.This is measured as the fraction of the variance of the forecast errors that is
14
attributed to each of the shocks (cf. Ltitkepohl 1993, ch. 2.3.3). Tables 2-5 present the forecast-error
variance decompositions for GDP and unemployment in US, Germany, UK and Norway respectively.
The identification restriction that aggregate demand disturbances have no long run effect on GDP,
implies that as the forecast horizon reaches infinity, 100 pct. of the variation in GDP is explained by
aggregate supply and real oil price shocks. However, at shorter horizons, the relative contributions of
aggregate demand, supply and oil price disturbances to GDP fluctuations are unrestricted.

































































Real oil price shocks have only an initial small effect on output. However, after three to four years,
oil price shocks explain about 20 pct. of output fluctuations in the US, increasing to 25 pct. after ten
years. In UK, the effect is largest after two years, where 10 pct. of output fluctuations are explained
by oil price movements. The effect in Germany is smaller, and less than 8 pct. of output movements
are explained by oil price shocks after three years. In Norway, oil price shocks have a positive long
run effect on output that increases over time, and from three years and onwards, about 5 pct. of output
movements are explained by oil price shocks. Oil price shocks have little importance in explaining
unemployment fluctuations in all countries the first year, but after three years, 2-5 pct. of
unemployment fluctuations are explained by oil price shocks. The effect is largest in Germany.































































In the short term, aggregate demand disturbances contribute to most of the variation in output in US,
UK and Norway, with 60-90 pct. of the variation in GDP explained by aggregate demand shocks
initially. The relative contribution of aggregate demand disturbance thereafter declines gradually as
expected. Aggregate demand shocks play the most important role in explaining unemployment
fluctuations the first year in all countries except in UK, where aggregate supply shocks are more
important. After two to three years, aggregate demand shocks explain about 70-90 pct. of
unemployment variation in Norway, US and Germany and about 40 pct. of the variation in
unemployment in UK.
15
Aggregate supply disturbances explain about 15-40 pct. of the variation in GDP in US, UK and
Norway the first quarter, whereas in Germany 75 pct. of output fluctuations are explained initially by
aggregate supply disturbances. Thereafter aggregate supply disturbances become more important, and
after ten years, supply disturbances explain about 60-70 pct. of output fluctuations in US and
Germany, and about 80 pct. of output fluctuations in UK and Norway.
Table 4. Variance Decomposition of GDP and Unemployment in UK    










































































To conclude this section, I summarise the main findings up to now. The responses of output and
unemployment to demand disturbances (temporary shocks) in US, UK and Norway, seem consistent
with what a Keynesian approach to business cycles would have predicted (cf. section 3). Demand
disturbances are the most important factor behind output fluctuations in the short mn, but eventually
prices and wages adjust to restore equilibrium.
Table 5. Variance Decomp osition of GDP and Unemploym
GDP
















































































The initial increase in both output and unemployment after supply disturbances (permanent shocks)
seen most clearly in US, UK and Norway, indicate again that there may be nominal and real rigidities
present in these countries. Productivity shocks increase output, but with a rigid nominal price level,
aggregate demand fails to increase with enough to prevent unemployment from rising (cf. Blanchard
and Quah 1989 p. 663). When prices and wages eventually adjust, unemployment falls gradually back
to its equilibrium level.
In the real business cycle view, supply disturbances (technology changes), are the driving force
behind short term economic fluctuations (e.g. Kydland and Prescott 1982). Prices are flexible and
economic fluctuations will reflect changes in agents behaviour to stochastic shocks as technology. In
these models, policy changes have no effect on output, as agents are rational and anticipate prices. In
Germany, "supply disturbances" are more important than "demand disturbances" in explaining output
fluctuations in the short term, and indicate that a real business cycle view may be applicable. Recall
also that although demand disturbances are most important in US, UK and Norway in the short run,
16
after two years, supply shocks (permanent shocks) explain between 40 and 60 pct. of output fluctuations,
and are therefore also important contributors for_the business cycles in the medium term.
In Germany, US and UK, GDP declined temporary after an oil price shock, and in US, the effect
remained negative also in the long run. However, in Norway, GDP actually increased in response to
oil price shocks. Why should output in US respond more negatively to an oil price shock than output
in Germany (and UK), and why do Norway and UK (both being oil exporting countries) respond so
differently?
The structure of the economy will probably play an important role for the macroeconomic
adjustments to oil price shocks. Countries with low production dependence of oil, low share of oil in
the consumption bundle, and relatively low labour intensities in production, will suffer less from oil
price shocks. Germany has typically had a relatively small value of labour intensity in the traded
goods sector and a low share of oil in consumption, and may therefore have been less severely
affected by the oil price increases, (see e.g. Lehment 1982, Fieleke 1988 and Nandakumar 1988 for
discussions). Raasche and Tattom (1981) suggest that as Germany has traditionally had higher duty
on oil prices than US, it may therefore have replaced oil as an energy source in some of the industry
with nuclear power or coal. Especially, between 1973 and 1979, consumption of crude petroleum per
capita declined slightly in Germany, whereas in US, consumption of crude petroleum per capita
increased. Total import of crude petroleum also declined slightly between 1973 and 1979 in
Germany, but increased in US, (cf. UN Yearbook of World Energy Statistics).
The fact that in UK output decreased, whereas in Norway, output actually increased in response to an
oil price shock, emphasises how two countries that are self sufficient with oil resources can react very
differently to oil price shocks, at least in the short term. These results are also consistent with the
findings in Mork et al. (1994). Although the oil sector plays a much larger role in Norway than in
UK, macroeconomic policy has also been conducted very differently in light of the two major oil
price shocks in Norway and UK14. In Norway, the oil price increases raised the net national wealth,
allowing the government to follow an expansionary fiscal policy during the latter part of the 1970s
and early in the 1980s. UK was self sufficient with oil resources when the second oil price shocks
occurred, but fiscal and monetary policies have remained relatively tight during the 1980s, aimed
primarily at combating the high inflation rates in that period. Also, with factory closures and rapidly
increasing unemployment rates from 1979 in UK, much of the revenues from the increased oil prices
went into social security in addition to payment of existing external debts.
The VAR model estimated above, implies that if oil price increases decrease output, oil price
decreases will increase output. However, some authors like Mork et al. (1994), argue that oil price
increases and decreases have had asymmetric effects on output growth in several countries like
Germany and US, (although maybe not in Norway and UK) 15 . Rather than investigating whether oil
price increases and decreases have symmetric effects, I finally investigate whether the effects of oil
price changes have been stable over time. I divide the sample into three periods, 1960-1971, 1972-
1981 and 1982-1994, and reestimate the model for US for each of the three periods. In the first period,
oil prices have been relatively stable, the second period is dominated by two huge oil price increases,
whereas in the third period, oil prices have fallen dramatically interrupted only by the 1990 Persian
Gulf War. The impulse response functions and variance decompositions are seen in appendix E.
From 1960 to 1971, adverse oil price shocks have negative effects on output in US, explaining
approximately 5-10 pct. of output variation. This is also consistent with Hamilton (1983), who found
14
 By 1980, oil and gas accounted for almost 10 pct. of GDP in Norway and 5 pct. of GDP in UK, whereas by 1993, almost
20 pct. of GDP was generated in the oil sector in Norway, but in UK, oil and gas accounted for only 2 pct. of GDP.
15 Mork et. al. (1994) distinguish between oil price decreases and oil price increases and analyse the effects of these oil price
changes through bivariate and multivariate correlations in a reduced-form macroeconomic model.
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a significant negative correlation between oil prices and output in US all the way back to the World
War II. Oil price shocks have approximately zero effect on unemployment in this period. From 1972-
1981, the two oil price shocks dominate output movements, and more than 50 pct. of output variation
is explained by oil price shocks. Oil price shocks explain approximately 15 pct. of the variation in
unemployment, and unemployment increases with 0.1-0.2 pct. points after two years. From 1982 to
1994, oil price shocks have almost no effect on GDP and unemployment, explaining less than 2 pct.
of output and unemployment variation.
Hence, oil price disturbances have had adverse effects on output in US during the 1960s, 1970s and
early 1980s, although during the middle/late 1980s and early 1990s (where oil prices have mostly
fallen, except during the Persian Gulf war), the effect of an adverse oil price shock is most likely
zero. However, these results should be interpreted as illustrations rather than formal analysis, as each
sample investigated is small (10 years), and will be dominated by the extreme values in this period.
Finally, demand and supply shocks are more stable, and except for the 1970's when oil price shocks
dominate, demand and supply shocks play constant roles during the 1960's, 1980's and 1990's.
6. Specific episodes
Above I investigated the responses of output to aggregate demand, supply and oil price shocks on
average over the whole (or sub) periods. The moving average representation in (12) also implies that I
can focus on specific historical periods, by computing the forecast errors in output using a weighted
average of the estimated shocks. The weights are given by the impulse responses in (12). The
decomposition is based on the following partition:
i-1	 -
(17) ztti = yi ps EH*, + D s t+i,
s.0
The first sum represents the part of zt+i that is due to innovations in period t+1 to t+j. The second sum
is the forecast (base projection) of z t,i , based upon information given at time t. The gap between each
data series and its base projection, can be assessed in terms of the contributions of the different
shocks for the forecast error in each variable in the analysis. The results are presented in figure 3-6
for US, Germany, UK and Norway respectively. In panel A-C in each figure, I plot the total forecast
error in output together with the forecast error that is due to oil price shocks, demand shocks and
supply shocks respectively for each country. As the variables are in logarithms, these plots can be
interpreted as pct. deviation from a trend. In panel D, log GDP is graphed together with the forecast
error in output that is associated with the supply shock when the drift term in the model is added, (I
will refer to this as the supply potential). Table 6-9 summarise the values for the forecast errors of
output due to each shock in the years 1974/1975 and 1979/1980.
The decomposition in (17) allows me to interpret economic fluctuations in terms of the different
shocks that have hit the economy. For all countries, the shocks identified (demand, supply and oil
price shocks) will be interpreted and assessed in terms of actual episodes that occurred in the periods
examined. I first note that the output fluctuations implied by the (sum of the) different shocks in each
country, correspond well with the common concepts of classical business cycles documented by the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) for US (the so-called business cycle chronologies),
and by e.g. Artis et al. (1995) for some other European countries, (although Artis et al. 1995 refer to
industrial production) 16 .
16 The NBER dates peaks and troughs of general economic activity in the US, with peaks preceded by periods of expansion
and troughs preceded by periods of contractions.
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Figure 3. Forecast Error Decompositions for GDP in United States
A) Oil price component, pct. change	 B) Aggregate demand component, pct. change
C) Aggregate supply component, pct. change D) Aggregate supply component, (drift term added)
The high growth rates in the US during most of the 1960s, seem to be mainly driven by positive
supply shocks. Output do not fluctuate much during this period, and the variation in output seems to
be characterised as slowly changing growth rates around a rising trend, rather than recurrent output
fluctuations. This can be seen from figure 3D, where output is either below the supply potential
(1960-1965), or above the supply potential (1965-1970)". From about the time of the first oil price
shock, output starts to fluctuate more violently. The recession from 1974-1976, was at first dominated
by negative oil price shocks, but from the end of 1975, both adverse oil price shocks and negative
supply shocks prolonged the recession, (see table 6). Recall that the jump upwards in the level of the
trend in the unemployment rate in 1974 (cf. section 5.1), occurred at the same time as the supply
potential and output fell down (cf. figure 3D). Several economists have argued that the long-run
patterns of growth changed in the middle 1970s, and e.g. Sachs (1982) noted that behind the cyclical
changes in 1973, was a more fundamental sharp decline in labour productivity growth.
With rising unemployment rates in 1973/1974, macroeconomic policies turned accommodating, and
from 1977, demand shocks contributed positively towards the boom in the late 1970s (cf. figure 38).
From 1980, oil price shocks triggered off a new recession, but the recession was short and lasted
initially only for a year. However, the government started to follow tight monetary policies, (although
17 A similar picture is drawn in Dornbusch and Fischer (1994, pp. 446-447), where the trend (or potential output) is defined
as the full employment (Okun) output.
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expansionary fiscal policies) and from 1981, negative demand shocks pushed the economy into a
prolonged recession that lasted almost until 1984. In contrast to the previous recession (1974-1976),
aggregate supply shocks play almost no role for the 1980-1984 recession, which can also be
confirmed in figure 3D, where output clearly lies below its supply potential during this period. The
dating of these cycles correspond well with NBER chronology, which interprets the early 1980s into two
cycles; the economy is at a bottom of a cycle (trough) in July 1980, thereafter the economy is recovering
and reaches a cyclical peak in July 1981, before it contracts until the next trough in December 1982.
Table 6. Forecast Error Decomposition for GDP in United States, 1974/1975 and 1979/19801 
AD-shock	 OP-shock	 AS-shock	 GDP 
	
74Q1-74Q2	 -2.2	 -1.4	 2.5	 -1.1
	
74Q3-74Q4	 0.0	 -3.0	 -1.5	 -4.5
	
75Q1-75Q2	 -0.8
	 -4.0	 -4.2	 -9.0
	
75Q3-75Q4	 0.8	 -2.9	 -3.3	 -5.4
	
79Q1-79Q2
	 1.7	 0.2	 0.3	 2.2
	
79Q3-79Q4	 1.6	 0.1	 -0.1	 1.6
	
80Q1-80Q2	 -0.6	 -0.8	 0.6	 -0.8
	80Q3-80Q4	 -2.2	 -1.7	 0.0	 -4.0 
1) AD = Aggregate Demand shock, OP= Oil price shock, AS = Aggregate supply shock.
Blanchard and Quah (1989) argued that the two recessions of 1974-1975 and 1979-1980, were
attributed to equally proportions of adverse supply and adverse demand shocks. By including oil
price shocks directly into the VAR, I have found that whereas supply disturbances (shocks with
permanent effect on output other than oil price shocks) have had an important role in explaining the
latter part of the 1973-1975 recession, supply shocks play virtually no role in the 1979-1980 recession.
In 1986, the fall in oil prices had a positive stimulus to output growth, but the overall performance of
the economy remained negative for two more years, as both demand and supply disturbances
contribute negatively to output fluctuations, (this is also suggested in e.g. Shapiro and Watson 1988,
and Barre11 and Magmussen 1996). From 1990, the economy experiences another recession, this time,
driven primarily by supply shocks. Blanchard (1993) also finds the recession in 1990-1991 to be
mainly driven by shocks with permanent effects, and argues that this is why the recovery that has
followed has been so sluggish. According to the NBER chronology, US has yet not seen the end of
this recession, with no reported peaks after the trough in March 1991.
After the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system in 1973, Germany had switched to a very restrictive
monetary policy to keep inflation rates down. The first oil price shock thus hit the economy after
some periods of monetary restrictions, when Germany was already at the beginning of a recession (cf.
figure 4B). From 1975, the recession is dominated by negative oil price shocks, but by 1976, the
economy is again booming (cf. figure 4A).
As in US, demand shocks stimulated the economy in some periods between the first and second oil price
shocks, and the boom in 1978-1980 was mainly driven by an expansionary fiscal policy (as the Bonn
summit in 1978 proposed that Germany should act as a locomotive to the rest of the world, cf. figure
4B). When the second oil price shock hit the economy, monetary policy was expansionary, and the
economy was booming. The adverse oil price shock in 1979/1980 had only a small negative effect on
the economic performance in the early 1980s, but a series of negative supply shocks eventually turn the
economy into a recession (cf. table 7). In contrast to US, negative demand shocks have little or no
adverse effects on output in Germany in the early 1980s, although monetary polices were quickly
tightened from 1979 onwards to avoid high inflation rates. Rasche and Tatom (1981) suggest that the
policy responses in Germany that avoided the high inflation rates, also minimised the real effects of
energy shocks, through the appreciation of DM relative to the pricing currency in the world energy market.
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Figure 4. Forecast Error Decompositions for GDP in Germany
A) Oil price component, pct. change	 B) Aggregate demand component, pct. change
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In table 1 we saw that despite the fact that Germany managed to maintain low inflation rates during
the 1970s and 1980s, output growth was relatively weak and unemployment slowly rising, indicating
a structural weakness of the German economy. Hellwig and Neumann (1987) and the discussions
there, suggest that this weakness was attributed to structural rather than cyclical factors. From figure
4C and D, one can see that supply shocks contribute negatively during most of the 1980s, so output
growth remains sluggish and GDP lies below its supply potential until late in the 1980s. The business
cycle chronology in Ards et al. (1995) also suggests that the recovery in the German economy in the
1980s was very slow, as the trough in November 1982 was first preceded by a peak in June 1991.
Table 7. Forecast Error Decomposition for GDP in Germany, 1974/1975 and 1979/19801 
	AD-shock	 OP-shock	 AS-shock	 GDP
	74Q1-74Q2	 -0.2	 -0.1	 2.5	 2.2
	
74Q3-74Q4	 -1.5	 -0.4	 1.0	 -0.9
	
75Q1-75Q2	 -2.1	 -1.6	 -0.6	 -4.3
	
75Q3-75Q4	 -0.7	 -1.5	 -0.4	 -2.6
	
79Q1-79Q2	 2.1	 0.3	 -1.6	 0.7
	
79Q3-79Q4	 2.5	 0.3	 -1.5	 1.3
	
80Q1-80Q2	 2.9	 -0.1	 -1.8	 0.9
	
80Q3-80Q4	 2.5	 -0.5	 -3.1	 -1.0 
1) AD = Aggregate Demand shock, OP= Oil price shock, AS = Aggregate supply shock.
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The huge boom from 1989 to 1993 is both demand and supply driven. The boom is attributed to the
German unification in 1989, which brought with it large (real) supply effects but also important
demand effects during the following three years. However, from 1992 negative demand disturbances
again plunge the economy into a (small) recession.
In United Kingdom, the 1970s was characterised with a series of positive demand shocks, especially
in 1972/1973 under the Heath government, where the broad monetary stock exploded by over 50 pct
(the Barber Boom, named after the Chancellor at the time, see e.g. Smith 1988). The economy
continued to grow from stimulative demand policies (the so-called mini budgets) under the Wilson
labour government from 1974, and the adverse oil price shocks in 1973/1974 led only to a temporary
decline in output (see figure 5 and table 8). However inflation was rising violently in this period (cf.
table 1), and when the Thatcher government took over in 1979, on of its primary aims was to reduce
inflation.
The new government believed in tight monetary control to combat the high inflation rates, and one of
the first tasks was to announce severe monetary policy tightening, and public expenditure cuts in the
June 1979 budget, and subsequently in the March 1980 budget. The economy started to drop
drastically from the end of 1979. However, in contrast to US that adopted expansionary fiscal
policies, UK continued to pursue tight fiscal policies, and announced new severe budget cuts in
Figure 5. Forecast Error Decompositions for GDP in United Kingdom
A) Oil price component, pct. change
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C) Aggregate supply component, pct. change D) Aggregate supply component, (drift term added)
March 1981. The effects on the economy were grave. Output fell drastically, especially manufacturing
output, which decreased by more than 15 percent from 1979 to 1980, and unemployment rose by
more than 1 million in a year.
Table 8. Forecast Error Decomposition for GDP in United Kingdom, 1974/1975 and 1979/19801 
AD-shock	 OP-shock	 AS-shock	 GDP 
	
74Q1-74Q2	 2.4	 -1.0	 0.8	 2.2
	
74Q3-74Q4	 2.5	 -1.1	 1.5	 2.9
	
75Q1-75Q2	 -0.1	 -1.7	 1.4	 -0.4
	
75Q3-75Q4	 -0.3	 -2.0	 1.4	 -0.8
	
79Q1-79Q2	 -0.1	 0.2	 -OA	 0.1
	
79Q3-79Q4	 -0.9	 0.0	 -0.6	 -1.5
	
80Q1-80Q2	 -1.4	 -0.1	 -2.2	 -3.6
	
80Q3-80Q4	 -2.5	 -0.6	 -2.4	 -5.5 
1) AD = Aggregate Demand shock, OP= Oil price shock, AS = Aggregate supply shock.
The effects of these shocks can also clearly be seen in figure 5 and table 8. The oil price shock in
1980 played only a small role in the recession in UK from 1979-1983. Negative demand shocks
contributed to the decline of the economy from 1979, however from 1981, negative supply shocks are
mostly to blame for the severity of the recession. These negative permanent "supply shocks" may
have had long lasting negative effects on the economy (see e.g. Hemming 1982 and Buiter and Miller
1983 for analyses of this specific period). In figure 5D, the supply potential shifted down drastically
from 1980 onwards. The timing of this downwards shift in output, corresponds well with the timing
of the break upwards in the unemployment rate in 1980Q2 (cf. section 5.1).
With positive supply shocks (from e.g. productivity growth), the economy recovers after 1982 (cf.
figure 5). Matthews and Minford (1987) also argue that once supply side policies were introduced by
the government, it had significant effects on productivity growth. From 1987 to 1991, UK
experiences a demand led boom. Positive demand shocks (from an increase in real spendings) drive
output above its supply potential, but from 1991, demand shocks again contribute negatively to
output movements.
In section 5.2, adverse oil price shocks were found to have positive effect on output in Norway. This
is understood more clearly by examining figure 6A. The adverse oil price shocks in 1973/1974 have
huge positive effects on output in Norway until 1976. The oil price shocks in 1979/1980 have much
less effects on the economy, although they contribute positively to output movements until 1982. The
subsequent fall in oil prices in 1986 contribute negatively to output movements from 1986 to 1988,
and thereafter the effect is both positive and negative.
The first oil price shock in 1973/1974 occurred at a time when the Norwegian economy had just
discovered huge oil resources in the North Sea. By 1975, Norway was ready as a producer of oil and
gas. However, the prospect of increased oil revenues brought about by higher oil prices in 1973/1974,
created a potential for profitable output in Norway. By the end of the 1970's, Norway was a net
exporter of oil, so when the second oil price rise occurred in 1979/1980, overall national wealth
increased further.
During the 1970s, demand shocks and supply shocks are also important contributors behind the good
economic performance in the 1970s, and especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s, positive
demand shocks are the most important factors behind the high growth rates. The positive demand
shocks coincides with the expansionary fiscal policies that the government followed in this period
(especially from 1974-1977).
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Figure 6. Forecast Error Decompositions for GDP in Norway
A) Oil Price component, pct. change	 B) Aggregate demand component, pct. change
C) Aggregate supply component, pct. change D) Aggregate supply component, (drift term added)
During the 1980s, Norway experienced two severe recessions. From figure 6, one can see that these
two recessions are due to entirely different shocks. The first recession from 1982 to 1985, is primarily
demand driven, and supply shocks actually contribute positively to output fluctuations in this period.
The economy thereafter experiences a demand driven boom, set off primarily by the financial
deregulation in 1984/1985. However, the collapse of oil prices in 1986 contribute negatively to
output growth, by eroding the government of potential future income streams. From 1988, the
spending boom in Norway accumulates in a severe financial crisis. GDP growth is again falling and
now unemployment is also rising drastically (cf. table 1). This recession is mainly driven by negative
supply shocks, although demand shocks are also negative later in this period. This can be seen in
figure 6D, where the supply potential shifts down with GDP in 1988. The time of the fall in the
supply potential, corresponds well with the break in the level of the trend in unemployment in
1988Q2 (cf. section 5.1).
The economy recovers somewhat by 1990, but by that time the international economy is slowing
down, and now demand shocks contribute negatively to output growth until 1993. However, from
1993, demand is on a steep upturn.
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Table 9. Forecast Error Decomposition for GDP in Norway, 1974/1975 and 1979/19801
AD	 OP	 AS	 GDP 
	
74Q1-74Q2	 3.1	 -0.4	 2.2	 4.8
	
74Q3-74Q4	 2.0	 1.4	 1.6
	 4.9
	
75Q1-75Q2	 1.0	 1.8	 3.0	 5.8
	
75Q3-75Q4	 -2.0	 1.3	 0.5	 -0.3
	
79Q1-79Q2	 0.7	 -0.1	 -0.7	 -0.1
	
79Q3-79Q4	 2.5	 0.1	 0.6	 3.2
	
80Q1-80Q2	 2.6	 0.1	 0.7	 3.4
	80Q3-80Q4	 2.1	 0.6	 1.2	 3.8 
1) AD = Aggregate Demand shock, OP= Oil price shock, AS = Aggregate supply shock.
7. Conclusions
By using a minimum of restrictions on a VAR model, I have been able to inteipretate economic
fluctuations in Germany, Norway, United Kingdom and United States in terms of different shocks
that have hit the economy. For all countries, the shocks identified (demand, supply and oil price
shocks) are well interpreted in terms of actual episodes that occurred in the periods examined.
Demand disturbances (temporary shocks) are most important for GDP in the short run in United
States, United Kingdom and Norway, although already after two to three years (at the so called
business cycle frequencies), supply shocks (permanent shocks) dominate. In Germany, supply shocks
play the most important role at all horizons.
In Germany, United Kingdom and United States, an adverse oil price shock has had a negative effect
on output, but only in US is the effect negative also in the long run. For Norway, a small oil exporting
country, an adverse oil price shock stimulates the economy, although in the long run, the effect is most
likely zero. The different response in UK and Norway to an energy price shock, emphasises how two
countries that are self sufficient with oil resources can react very differently to oil price shocks,
especially if the governments have different priorities when deciding on macroeconomic policies.
In Germany, UK and US, the oil price shocks in 1973/1974 are among the most important factors
behind the recession in the middle 1970s. The oil price shocks in 1979/1980 play a much smaller role
for output movements in all countries. Negative demand disturbances (e.g. contractionary monetary
policies) are much more important in explaining the severe recession in the early 1980s in UK and
US (although in UK negative supply disturbances play the most important role from 1981), whereas in
Germany, negative supply disturbances are mostly to blame for the poor economic performance in the
1980s.
Despite the many advantages of using a simple structural VARs, it is also subject to some limitations.
Especially, a small VAR should be viewed as an approximation to a larger structural system, since
the limited number of variables and the aggregate nature of the shocks, implies that we will for
instance not be able to distinguish between different aggregate demand shocks (like e.g. increases in
money supply or fiscal policy).
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Appendix A: Data sources
All series are seasonally adjusted quarterly data, unless otherwise stated. The series are seasonally
adjusted by their respective sources. The periodicity varies and is given for each country. All
variables are measured in natural logarithms except for the unemployment rate that is measured in
levels. For each country, I use total GDP or GNP, except for Norway, where I use GDP in mainland
Norway (that is GDP generated in the sectors other than the oil producing sectors), which account for
approximately 80 pct. of total GDP.
United States: 1960Q1-1994Q4
Gross Domestic Product, constant 1991 prices. Source: OECD
Unemployment, civil labour force. Source: OECD
Implicit GDP deflator. Source: OECD
Germany: 1969Q1-1994Q4
Gross Domestic Product, constant 1991 prices. Source: OECD
Unemployment, (West Germany) . Source: OECD
Implicit GDP deflator. Source: OECD
Exchange rate, mth. average DEM/USD, (n.s.a.). Source OECD.
United Kingdom: 1966Q1-1994Q4
Gross Domestic Product, constant 1991 prices. Source: Datastream
Unemployment rate, total labour force. Source: OECD
Implicit GDP deflator. Source: OECD
Exchange rate, mth. average GBP/USD, (n.s.a.). Source OECD.
Norway: 1967Q1-1994Q4
Gross Domestic Product, mainland Norway (GDP less petroleum activities and ocean transport)
constant 1991 prices. Source: Statistics Norway
Unemployment rate. Source: Statistics Norway
Consumer Price Index. Source: Statistics Norway
Exchange rate, mth. avg. NOK/USD, (n.s.a.). Source OECD.
For all countries:
Nominal Oil price: Saudi Arabian Light-34, USD per barrel, fob- (n.s.a.). Prior to 1980, posted
prices, thereafter spot prices. Source: OPEC BULLETIN and Statistics Norway
Real Oil Price: Nominal Oil Price converted to each countries national currency by the exchange rate
and deflated by each countries implicit GDP deflator, except for Norway which uses the consumer
price index (as oil prices may be included in the GDP deflator, as approximately 20 pct. of GDP in











Sequential F-tests	 p-value Direct F-tests
F( 9, 209) = 8.99	 0.000	 F(63, 203) = 2.62
F( 9, 202) = 1.91	 0.052	 F(54, 203) = 1.46
F( 9, 194) = 2.50	 0.009	 F(45, 202) = 1.35
F( 9, 187) = 2.03	 0.036	 F(36, 201) = 1.05
F( 9, 180) = 0.84	 0.581	 F(27, 199) = 0.75
F( 9, 172) = 0.86	 0.561	 F(18, 192) = 0.72


















1) For a description of these tests, see table B.1.




















F( 9, 238) = 2.76	 0.004
F( 9, 231) = 0.84	 0.581
F( 9, 224) = 3.77	 0.000
F( 9, 216) = 0.79	 0.625
F( 9, 209) = 0.86	 0.558
F( 9, 202) = 0.81	 0.606
F( 9, 194) = 0.41	 0.927
Direct F-tests
F(63, 239) = 1.4472
F(54, 239) = 1.2127
F(45, 238) = 1.2801
F(36, 237) = 0.7038
F(27, 234) = 0.6831
F(18, 226) = 0.6042









Appendix B: Model specifications-Determination of lag order and
test for general serial correlation in the residuals

















F( 9, 297) =4.92
F( 9, 289) =2.81
F( 9, 282) =1.15
F( 9, 275) =0.16
F( 9, 267) =0.91
F( 9, 260) =1.37








F(63, 311) = 1.64
F(54, 310) = 1.09
F(45, 309) = 0.76
F(36, 308) = 0.67
F(27, 304) = 0.84
F(18, 294) = 0.82









Lags SC	 HQ	 Sequential F-tests	 p-value	 Direct F-tests
1) SC reports the Schwarz information criteria, HQ reports the Hannan-Quinn information criteria, sequential F-test with
corresponding p-value reports the sequential model reductions (8->7,... 92-41 lags), direct F-test with corresponding p-value
reports the direct model reductions (8-+7,	 8->1 lags). All test-statistics are calculated using PcFiml 8.0 (see Doomik and
Hendry 1994).
Table B.2 Germany: Information criteria and F-tests for model reductions'







3	 Q(8) = 5.33
Q(24)=25.96
5	 Q(8) = 7.75
Q(24)=29.91
6	 Q(8) = 2.24
Q(24)=10.97
























































F( 9, 228) = 1.93
F( 9, 221) = 1.51
F( 9, 214) = 1.51
F( 9, 207) = 0.17
F( 9, 199) = 1.18
F( 9, 192) = 0.72










F(63, 227) = 1.25
F(54, 227) = 1.13
F(45, 226) = 1.06
F(36, 225) = 0.95
F(27, 222) = 1.21
F(18, 215) = 1.21









1) For a description of these tests, see table B.1.
Table B.5 Ljung-Box Q-statistics (marginal significance level)"
1) The Ljung-Box Q-statistic is treated as a chi-square with M degrees of freedom, where M is the number of autocorrelations
given in parenthesis. The p-value, reports the marginal significance level.
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Appendix C: Tests for unit root and cointegration
Tests for unit roots and cointegration are presented below. To determine whether the underlying process
of a series is difference stationary or trend-stationary, I estimate the now well known augmented Dickey
Fuller (ADF) regression. A test for unit root when a x-series follows an AR(p+1) process and allowing
for both a constant and a time trend in the regression model, can be carried out by testingix=0, versus the
alternative that g<0 in:
(C.1)
p+1




Ar t =o t o +a l t +	 +1y	 + E t
i= 1
where tt= EP+10 — 1 and y ; -- -1P 	, j -- 1,2, ...p and Et is assumed to be i.i.d. Gaussian withJ=1 .1	 k=j+1
mean zero and a positive definite covariance matrix. The asymptotic ADF distribution can be obtained
by Fuller (1976). As the results of the unit-root tests will be sensitive to the serial dependence in the
error term, higher order AR lags may be most appropriate for capturing the serial correlation in the data.
With quarterly data, it seems therefore reasonable to perform ADF tests using between 4 and 8 lags. The
results using 8 AR lags are reported in table C.1. However, the conclusions there are unchanged using
any lag length from 4 to 8 lags, except for US where, using 4 lags, I can reject the hypothesis that GDP is
I(1) at the 10 pct. level, and for UK, using 7 lags, I can reject the hypothesis that GDP is I(1) at the 5 pct.
level. However based on any other lag length, there is overwhelming evidence that GDP is 1(1) in both
countries, and without the assumption that GDP is I(1), the whole exercise of defining shocks that have
permanent effects on GDP will be meaningless.
I now expand the ADF tests against the trend-stationary alternative by allowing the unemployment
series to have a structural shift/break in the trend. I follow Zivot and Andrews (1992) that treat the
possible break point as unknown in the time series. The testing strategy is to test the null hypothesis
of a unit root against the alternative hypothesis that unemployment is stationary around a
deterministic time trend with a one time change occurring at an unknown point in time. Following the
notation in Zivot and Andrews (1992), the change in the trend is either modelled as a single change in
the level of the trend (case A below), as a single change in the growth rate of the trend (case B
below), or both changes at the same time (case C below). The test is computed sequentially using the
full sample. To test for a unit root versus the alternative of a change in the trend can now be
estimated by expanding on the ADF regression above:
p+1









where ,u = 1P+10 — 1 and y i =	 epk , i = 1,2, ...p, DUt(k) is a dummy variable that capturesj=1
the possible change in the trend at period k and E, is assumed to be i.i.d. Gaussian with mean zero and a
positive definite covariance matrix. In case (A) (change in the level of the trend), DUt(k) is specified as:
(A) DU, (k) = 1 if t)k, 0 otherwise.
in case (B) (change in slope of the trend), DUt(k) is specified as:
(B) DU t (k) = t - k if t)k, 0 otherwise.
whereas in case (C) I assume both a change in the level and the slope of the trend.
For each of the cases A, B and C, I compute; tiADF_min Millko-q6T-kot(k)ADF for i = A, B, C, that is the
minimal tADF value over all sequentially computed tADF statistics. The finite sample critical values and
the empirical size and nominal power of the test statistics described above, are established by Monte
Carlo simulation in Zivot and Andrews (1992). The test results are presented in table C.2.
To test for cointegration between the variables in the model, I use the Johansen Maximum Likelihood
Procedure, see Johansen (1988, 1991). Rewriting zt as a cointegrated formula, wt (Yte ot, ut)', where
u, is the unemployment rate adjusted for the structural break, the error-correction form is equal to:
x-n k(C.3)	 Aw = u +i=1Awt-1 + afiwzt-1 + E t
where E, is assumed to be i.i.d. Gaussian with mean zero and a positive definite covariance matrix.
The assumption of cointegration is formulated as a reduced rank of the total impact multiplier 00',
where a and 13 are p x r matrices of rank r, where 0<p<r. The number of lags included in (C.3) are set
equal to the number of lags used in the VAR models in the analysis. That is, for US I use three lags,
for Germany I use five lags and for Norway and UK I use six lags.
The trace statistics indicate that there is no evidence of cointegration at the 5 pct. level in US and
Norway, but in Germany and UK, the trace statistics reject the null hypothesis of no cointegrating
vector at the 5 pet level (but not at the 1 pct. level). However, adjusted for degrees of freedom as the
sample is small (see Reimers 1992), the trace statistics can not reject the null hypothesis of no
cointegration even at the 5 pct. level.
The assumption that u, is stationary, nevertheless implies that wt is in fact cointegrated with a
cointegrator vector (0,0,1). Testing this restriction that there are only nonzero elements on the
stationary variables in the cointegrating vector is trivial and add nothing to the analysis above (see the
discussion in Quah 1995), except being a further check on whether u, is stationary. Nevertheless,
imposing one cointegrating vector, in none of the countries can I reject the hypothesis that if w, is
cointegrated, it is cointegrated with cointegrating vector (0,0,1), hence u, is stationary. Finally, I have
also examined the restriction that y, and o, are cointegrated, that is, y, - o t —I(0). Imposing again one






















































1) The critical values for the full sample Augmented Dickey Fuller statistic was taken from Table 8.5.2 in Fuller (1976)
table 8.5.2 p 373. A time trend and a constant are included in the regression of the level of y, o and u, whereas in the
regression using first differences, a constant (but no time trend) is included in the regression.
* Rejection of the unit-root hypothesis at the 10 pct. level
** Rejection of the unit-root hypothesis at the 5 pct. level
*** Rejection of the unit-root hypothesis at the 2.5 pct. level
Table C.2. Sequential unit-roots test for Unemploymentl
1) The critical values for the Sequential test statistics were taken from Zivot and Andrews (1992, p256-257). The
10 pct. (5 pct.) critical value for model A (change in the level), is -4.58 (-4.80), for model B (change in the growth rate),
is -4.11 (-4.42) and for model C (both a change in the level and the growth rate), is -4.82 (-5.08).
* Rejection of the unit-root hypothesis at the 10 pct. level
** Rejection of the unit-root hypothesis at the 5 pct. level
Table C.3. Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure, Trace testsl
Critical
110 H 1 	Values	 US
95% 99 %	 DF-adj.
	
r=0 r>,1 29.68 35.65 22.35	 20.88
	
r_2 15.41 20.04 10.23	 9.56
r5_2 r>3 3.76 6.65	 1.91	 1.79
1) DF-adj refers to the eigenvalue adjusted for degrees of freedom (see Reimers 1992). All test-statistics are calculated
using PcFiml 8.0 (see Doornik and Hendry 1994). Critical values are taken from Table 1 in Osterwald-Lenum (1992).
Table C.4. Test of Restrictions on Cointegrated vectors
Cointegrated vector (0, 0, 1)
ut-I (0)
LR-test	 p-value
Cointegrated vector (1, -1, 0)
Yt - cot"' I (0)
LR-test	 p-value
US	 4.56
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Figure D.2. USA, response to aggregate demand shock
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Appendix D: Impulse Response Functions with one standard
error band
Figure D.1. USA, response to oil price shock
A) GDP	 B) Unemployment
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Figure DS. United Kingdom, response to oil price shock
A) GDP	 B) Unemployment
Figure D.6. Norway, response to oil price shock



































Appendix E: Impulse responses and variance decompositions in
United States, 1960-1971, 1972-1981 and 1982-1994
1960-1971
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1) AD = Aggregate Demand shock, OP = Oil Price shock, AS = Aggregate Supply shock.
Table E.1. Variance Decomposition of GDP and Unemployment
1972-1981
Figure E.2. Impulse Response Functions:'
A) GDP B) Unemployment
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1) AD = Aggregate Demand shock, OP = Oil Price shock, AS = Aggregate Supply shock.
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